Research Summary: Towards On-Device Evidence Gathering for Intimate Partner Infiltration: A Feasibility Study for Joint Identity-Action Detection

Research from arXiv explores Intimate Partner Infiltration (IPI), a form of phone-side privacy infiltration within close relationships, often linked to technology-facilitated Intimate Partner Violence (IPV). This type of infiltration relies on perpetrators' physical access to a smartphone and personal knowledge, bypassing conventional security measures. The study highlights the need for device-side tools to gather evidence of such risks, contrasting with existing, expert-intensive, and episodic solutions like security clinics which offer limited automated visibility.

Why it matters

The increasing reliance on personal technology makes device-side privacy infiltration a critical concern, especially when existing security measures are circumvented by trust and physical access. Addressing this type of threat requires innovative technical solutions that provide automated, continuous monitoring capabilities, which could impact user trust, data security, and the design of consumer technologies.

Key insights

• Intimate Partner Infiltration (IPI) involves phone-side privacy breaches in intimate relationships, often enabled by physical device access.
• IPI is contextualized within technology-facilitated Intimate Partner Violence (IPV).
• Perpetrators utilize proximity and personal knowledge to bypass standard smartphone protections.
• There is a recognized need for targeted interventions, specifically device-side tools, to surface evidence of IPI risks for later review.
• Current solutions, such as security clinics, are effective but are episodic, human-expert-intensive, and lack automated visibility into ongoing infiltration.

Source

arXiv — Computers and Society — https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.03682