Research Summary: Don't Trust the Super-App: A Case Study of Russia's Max

Research from arXiv highlights a critical vulnerability in the prevalent assumption that super-apps are trusted intermediaries. The paper argues that this trust is often unwarranted, citing examples from China, Russia, and Iran where super-apps have been implicated in extensive user tracking, state surveillance, and resilience during internet shutdowns due to state backing. The study posits that malicious super-apps possess capabilities to silently compromise user privacy and security.

Why it matters

This research challenges fundamental assumptions regarding the security and trustworthiness of super-app ecosystems, which are becoming increasingly central to digital economies and public interaction. It highlights potential risks associated with data privacy, state surveillance, and digital autonomy, necessitating a re-evaluation of security frameworks and regulatory approaches for these platforms.

Key insights

• The prevailing assumption in security research that super-apps act as trusted intermediaries is problematic and difficult to justify.
• Super-apps, by design, host third-party mini-apps within a single application, providing diverse services.
• China's WeChat has been observed passively tracking user activity across mini-apps on a significant scale.
• Russia's MAX super-app is associated with a parent company reportedly involved in state prosecution of online speech.
• Iran's Bale super-app functioned during a prolonged internet shutdown, suggesting state-backed support.
• The research indicates that malicious super-apps have inherent capabilities to covertly undermine user security and privacy.

Source

arXiv — Computers and Society — https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.11814